The revolution that occurred in Germany in 1918 -1919 was not
really a revolution - at least
not in the traditional sense of the French Revolution of 1789
and the Russian Revolution of 1917, or even the German Revolution
of 1848. Perhaps, by calling it the "German Revolution,"
we imply that things are conceived and done differently in Germany.
Perhaps, that is true. Her political traditions were somewhat
different from those of France and Russia.
The conditions which gave birth to revolution in November 1918
were unlike those of 1789 in France, and although somewhat similar
to those in Russia in 1917, they were still not quite the same.
Neither in France nor Russia did revolution come as a complete
surprise even to purported revolutionaries. But it did in Germany.
There was no sustained revolutionary agitation and strategy preceding
it and when it came even the Social Democrats were completely
overwhelmed by events.
The war was lost, the emperor fled: a war-weary and hungry country
became rebellious. So, the government turned to the Social Democrats
in desperation. They were asked, nat to make a revolution-they
were reformist by nature anyway-but to liquidate the crumbling
edifice of the empire. The Socialists wound up doing things they
did nat really want to do-they crushed their Spartacist cousins
by force, preserved bourgeois society and re-created the army
in the process. There were no stirring revolutionary manifestoes,
no radical breaks in policy, no marching songs like the "Marseillaise"
or the "Internationale."
It was the first songless revolution in history. Very few socialists,
except the leftwing Independents like Emil Barth, Richard Müller
and Georg Ledebour, claimed credit for making the revolution.
The Majority Socialists had always believed that revolutions were
not made in any case, but just happened in the course of socio-economic
evolution.
The German Revolution certainly did not follow the pattern of
the Leninist revolution just a year before. In fact, it could
more meaningfully be compared to the French situation in 1871.
In both instances there was a military defeat, complete political
and moral bankruptcy of the dynasty, absence of any popular enthusiasm
for the republic, a conservative majority confronting a radical
minority and, finally, the emergence of republican institutions
by default. In both cases middle-class leaders and Socialists
agreed on the republic as the only road to survival for both of
them. But the Third Republic in France lasted much longer because
there was a long revolutionary tradition in France, but none at
all in Germany. Germany's problem was not the absence of a Lenin
or Trotsky, but rather the absence of a Gambetta, Clemenceau,
Zola or Jaures, who could have instilled the nation with faith
in republican democratic institutions.
There were three centers of revolutionary action in November,
1918: Kiel, Munich and Berlin. In each one the underlying cause
was the desire for peace, much more so then the desire for genuine
social revolution. The rebels were against the Kaiser personally
and not necessarily against the institution of the monarchy. In
fact, if William II had not waited so long to abdicate, the monarchy
might have survived and the English system of constitutionally
limited monarchy might have developed. It was a combination of
the powerful desire for peace and the feeling that the Kaiser
stood in its way, that led to the precipitous proclamation of
the republic on November 9. Philip Scheidemann, who made this
announcement, seems to have acted out of momentary inspiration.
It "was the logical conclusion of a lost war," he wrote,
"of unmatched privation and of loathing of the war mongers....It
was the protest against the continuation of an utterly hopeless
slaughter....It was the day on which it was impossible to carry
on any longer."
This may be so, but another important reason was that Scheidemann
wanted to forestall a Bolshevik-type revolution, which he thought
the Sparticists were preparing. He also feared that Ebert had
secret plans to restore the monarchy and wanted to face him Whether
Ebert actually wanted to restore the monarchy is an open question,
but there is no doubt that a certain amount of revolutionary agitation
had been going on during the latter part of the war. The Independent
Socialists and later the Spartakus League were at the center of
this activity. Ledebour claimed that revolutionary plans had been
laid as early as 1916. These plans included a general strike to
bring the war to a revolutionary end. Propaganda and illegal literature
was distributed in the army and navy. But the Majority socialists
took over the strike and steered it to non-revolutionary ends.
On October 5, 1918 the Independent socialists issued a call for
a "socialist republic" as part of a world-wide movement.
A committee of "revolutionary shop stewards" was formed
and began to collect arms. A planned general strike for November
6 fell through, however, because the Independents could not agree
among themselves and the police arrested some of their leaders.
But the "revolutionary shop stewards," decided to act
on their own and strike on the 9th of November. This may have
been the reason for Scheidemann's proclamation of the republic
on that day.
Yet these were the actions of a small radical minority and they
had very little to do with the actual outbreak of revolution.
That happened quite independently in Kiel and Munich. What existed
in Germany then, was a revolutionary situation, in the sense that
there was widespread despair, stimulated by the military collapse,
apprehension about Bavarian separatism and a considerable amount
of Revolutionsfurcht, or fear of revolution. Because of this the
government of Prince Max made some last minute efforts at democratic
reforms. But they came too late. The whole situation was so volatile
that any incident would topple the whole structure. That incident
was provided by the sailor's revolt in Kiel.
The revolt at Wilhelmshaven and Kiel on October 30 was stimulated
by a rumor which said that the German fleet had been readied for
a last ditch effort to attack the English fleet in the North Sea.
The morale of the sailors was already low, aggravated by the monotony
of inactive ship life, larger and better food rations for officers
and the harsh discipline.
They were willing to listen to the anti-war propaganda of the
Independent Socialists and thought that an attack now, while armistice
negotiations were underway, was wholly senseless and suicidal.
They also believed that their commanders were acting without government
consent. So the men passed a resolution stating their refusal
to take the offensive. The officers replied by arresting some
of the sailors, which led to a mass demonstration of the men on
November 3. These demonstrations were fired on, resulting in 8
deaths and 29 wounded. The incident sparked considerable excitement
in the surrounding area and in radical circles. The Kiel workers
joined the movement on November 4 by creating the first soldiers.
and workers' council in Germany to defy the existing authorities.
But defiance and revolution are two different things. The revolters
did not have any sense of having ignited a revolution. The Workers'
and Soldiers' Council demanded release of political prisoners,
freedom of speech and press, abolition of censorship, better conditions
for the men, and that no orders be given for the fleet to take
the offensive. That does not constitute a revolution. In fact
the council even went so far as to guarantee the inviolability
of private property. When Noske, the Majority Socialist expert
on military affairs, was sent to Kiel to restore order, he had
no problem in doing so. However, the situation in the country
was such that the Kiel incident reverberated and the movement
soon spread to other cities.
On November 5 one northern newspaper wrote: "The revolution
is on the march: What happened in Kiel will spread throughout
Germany. What the workers and soldiers want is not chaos, but
a new order; not anarchy, but the social republic." The pattern
of development was quite similar everywhere soldiers and workers
councils took over local authority. In all cases the men in these
councils were socialists, mostly Majority Socialists, and Independents.
Only in a few instances did Spartacists control the councils.
The sailors revolt in Kiel thus inadvertently instigated the revolution,
although the sailors had no such aim in the beginning. It was
only in the course of events that this incident became integrated
with similar but quite independent happenings in Munich and Berlin.
Once this occurred the whole movement took on the character of
a revolution.
In Munich a more clear-cut revolutionary movement evolved when
Austria-Hungary capitulated and left Bavaria exposed to invasion.
The population became frightened and turned to the Independent
Socialists for leadership, because they were well-known peace
advocates. Separatist feelings, always strong in Bavaria, accompanied
the peace movement. The Independents, under the mercurial Kurt
Eisner, rode both issues to prominence.
A large meeting of workers planned by the Majority Socialists
for November 4, called for unity of the socialist parties, for
peace and certain minimal reforms. A mass demonstration on the
7th, carried on by thousands of workers, again was orderly and
made similar demands: bread and peace, the eight-hour day and
elimination of the dynasty. The Majority Socialists warned against
Bavarian separatism and emphasized that they were not calling
for strikes or revolution. They only wanted to create a "peoples
state." The people went home quite unaware of what was about
to transpire.
In the early morning hours of November 8 Kurt Eisner and the Independents
seized the initiative. They organized a "Constituent Soldiers'
Workers' and Peasants' Council." and this body in turn proclaimed
the establishment of a Bavarian Democratic and Social Republic,
headed by Kurt Eisner. This event took the Munich population by
surprise. Eisner included the peasants because he knew that without
them no movement could succeed in Bavaria. For the same reason
he promised that Bavaria would remain the "free state"
it had become. He formed a cabinet of Majority Socialists, Independents
and several prominent professors. While people milled in the streets
and some pillaged at the beginning, order soon returned everywhere
by the evening of the 8th.
Meanwhile, the new provisional government of Bavaria promised
peace, a constitutional convention, the security of property and
person, the maintenance of order, and the retention of all government
officials. For the country as a whole Eisner's group sought a
"United States of Germany," including Austria, the convening
of a constitutional convention, democratization, equal and free
status of all religious denominations and a national, state-controlled
educational system. But on the crucial revolutionary question
of economics, the government, while reaffirming its socialist
beliefs, deferred socialization. "It seems impossible for
us to transfer industry into the possession of the community at
a time when the productive forces of the country are almost exhausted.
It is impossible to socialize when there is hardly anything to
socialize."
The revolution in Bavaria had definite significance for the revolution
in the rest of Germany. This was more than a local revolt of sailors.
Eisner's actions in Munich pushed the socialist leaders in Berlin
to more urgent and immediate action. The proclamation of a republic
in Bavaria alleviated the fears among North German republicans
that "monarchist" Bavaria would secede from the Reich
if a a republic were proclaimed. The unified action of Majority
and Independent Socialists in Bavaria also set the pattern of
cooperation in other parts of the country.
In Berlin the two major issues were the armistice and the abdication
of the Kaiser. Both the government and the public believed that
the armistice would be easier to negotiate if William and the
entire ruling class were removed from responsibility. The interrelation
of these two questi
ons became the foundation for the policy of the Majority Socialists
who came to occupy the key positions as events progressed. Two
of them, Philip Scheidemann and Gustav Bauer had already joined
the cabinet of Prince Max when the reform of the constitution
began. On November 2 they began to put pressure on Max to secure
the abdication of the Kaiser, but they also asked their followers
to restrain from striking on November 4. But pressured from the
Left, the Majority Socialist party executive presented a list
of demands to Prince Max on November 6:
They wanted "freedom, not terror" as the Party newspaper
explained. "Not dictatorship but democracy: Not callous experimentation
on the living body of society, but a planned construction of a
new socialist economic order based upon scientific knowledge and
practical experience." All the demands were accepted by the
imperial government except the abdication, because the Kaiser
still hesitated to take that obvious step. So the socialists agreed
to postpone their ultimatum until November 9, but said that the
postponement was to allow the completion of the armistice negotiations.
Meanwhile, the Independents and Spartacists continued their preparation
for an uprising. Some of their leaders were arrested by the police
and the revolutionary shop stewards then prepared for revolutionary
action to protest these arrests.
By the evening of November 8 there still was no news from the
emperor's headquarters. The socialist ministers and undersecretaries
then all resigned from Max's cabinet. The SPD called a meeting
of the Greater Berlin Trade Union Council for 8:00 a.m. on the
next day and a 12-men action committee was ready to carry out
a general strike if the emperor did not abdicate. The general
strike and mass demonstrations were ordered by the SPD on the
morning of November 9. A Workers' and Soldiers' council was formed
and the regiments and troops stationed in Berlin were won over
largely through the hard work of Otto Wels.
Meanwhile, five Majority Socialists, including Ebert and Scheidemann
went to see Prince Max. They informed him that the troops had
joined their cause and that a new democratic government had to
be formed. When Ebert was asked whether he wanted to take power
on the basis of the constitution or the Soldiers' and Workers'
Council, he replied, "the constitution... Prince Max than
had no choice but to announce the anticipated abdication of the
Kaiser, although no word had been received from that reluctant
potentate. Prince Max turned over his office to Ebert and the
latter, signing himself as "Reich chancellor," issued
a proclamation.
This announcement of the new government clearly indicates that
it did not have in mind a Russian-type revolution. "The new
government," he said, will be a people's government. Its
goal will be to bring peace to the German people as soon as possible,
and to establish firmly the freedom which it has achieved."
The emphasis on maintaining legal continuity clearly shows that
Ebert believed the victory of the revolution had been achieved
by the transfer of power from Prince Max to himself. He also emphasized
peace and adequate supply of food, because he knew that was the
reason why the revolutionary situation had arisen in the first
place. Ebert was interested in creating a democratic state. Perhaps,
he might even have been satisfied with a constitutional monarchy
as long as the new state were founded via a constituent assembly.
But the press of human emotion in the streets soon made this carefully
planned scenario obsolete. Eisner's proclamation of a republic
in Bavaria and the agitation of the Independents and Spartacists
forced the Majority Socialists to proclaim a republic before the
Constituent Assembly had met. A mass demonstration of Berlin workers
swarmed around the Reichstag building, while Scheidemann decided
to take things in his own hand. At 2:00 p.m. on November 9 he
mounted the balcony and proclaimed the republic to the crowd.
In his memoirs he says that he did it to avoid Liebknecht proclamation
of a soviet republic and Ebert's secret plan to restore the monarchy.
At any rate when Scheidemann came in from the balcony he was met
with horrified anger by Ebert. "You have no right to proclaim
the republic," said Ebert. "What becomes of Germany-whether
she becomes a republic or something else-a constituent assembly
must decide." But what was done was done.
Ebert now made an effort to create socialist unity by offering
to share power with the Independents on an equal basis, although
the latter were greatly outnumbered in the Reichstag. After considerable
debate among themselves, the Independents decided to join the
government if the following conditions were met.
The Majority socialists met these conditions and the Independents
joined the government with Haase becoming co-chairman alongside
Ebert. The resulting Council of Peoples Representatives set for
itself the "realization of the socialist program." On
the following day (November 10) all the dynastic rulers of the
local states abdicated and were replaced by revolutionary governments
of one type or another. The new government signed the armistice
dictated by Marshall Foch. Thus the war came to an end and most
Germans believed the aims of the revolution had thus been achieved.
It was a bloodless revolution-that is if we can call it a revolution.
Only 15 people lost their lives in Berlin on November 9. Theodore
Wolff, the editor of the Berliner Tageblatt, called it "the
greatest of all revolutions." But Ernst Troeltsch, the noted
historian and religious philosopher, has given us a more realistic
description:
"Sunday, November 10 was a wonderful autumn day. The
citizens went as usual in droves to walk in the Grünewald.
No elegant toilette, only Bürger, many obviously and consciously
clad in simple garb. Everything somewhat subdued, like people
whose destiny is being decided somewhere far off in the distance
but who nevertheless are assured and at ease that things went
off as well as they did. Streetcars and subways are running as
usual, a guarantee that everything was in order for the immediate
needs-and food supplies. On all faces there was written: salaries
are being paid."