Foreign policy and domestic policy are always closely related.
This was particularly true of the Weimar Republic, because it
emerged within the context of a lost war, armistice and peace
negotiations, accompanied by demobilization and economic difficulties.
Throughout the 1920's elections and domestic political developments
were closely linked to the final liquidation of the war. In a
sense, the motive force behind the entire foreign policy of the
Weimar Republic originated in the nature of the peace concluded
at Versailles.
So, we have to look back at that peace-making procedure to explain
the gradual reinstatement of Germany within the European family
of nations. Harold Nicolson, a member of the British delegation
in Paris has left us his appraisal of the reasons why Versailles
was a failure. "We came to Paris," he wrote, "confident
that the new order was about to be established. We left it convinced
that the new order had merely fouled the old. We arrived as fervent
apprentices in the school of President Wilson. We left as renegades.
It was the misfortune of democratic diplomacy."
Nicolson goes on to elaborate the prevailing disillusionment of
the experts at Paris. The treaties which were imposed on the enemies
of the Allies, Nicolson believes, were neither just nor wise.
"Never in the history of man has such vindictiveness cloaked
itself in such unctuous sophistry." That there was an increasing
moral deterioration in the course of the conferences is unquestionable.
Greed and revenge soon raised its ugly head and vitiated the noble
and idealistic principles which Wilson sought to embed in the
new political structures. Although it should be evident, that
this kind of hypocrisy is found in all postwar settlements and
probably could not have been entirely avoided in Paris either.
There was a definite contrast between the new world concept symbolized
by a vigorous America emerging into great power status and the
old European world weighted down by tradition and resistance to
change. Evidence of a new scheme of things was, of course, also
found in the European countries, but mostly in Russia, Germany
and Austria, were revolutionary forces sought to restructure the
social and political system. But these powers were not represented
at Paris in 1919.
Wilson talked about a new diplomacy and so did the Soviets in
Russia, but at the peace conference the old diplomacy seemingly
prevailed. Wilson got his League of Nations, but it was accepted
grudgingly by the other allies. The attempt to reconcile the old
world and the new world was the essential error and misconception
of the conference and the root cause of all resultant falsity,
according to Nicolson. The suspicion that America was asking Europe
to make sacrifices to righteousness, which America would never
make, and had never made herself, produced a mood of diffidence,
uncertainty and increasing despair. The League of Nations, which
was to make Wilson's new order work, lost its significance and
viability when the U. S. Congress rejected American participation.
The only thing which Europe could do was to save the face of the
American president. The only thing that Wilson would do was to
save the face of Europe.
The face of Europe may have been saved, but it was subsequently
marred and scarred by persistent controversy and conflict over
the kind of compromises made at Versailles with regard to defeated
Germany. The Germans were quick to realize that the hurt conscience
of the Allies could be exploited for their own benefit. The critics
of Versailles in the Western countries provided propaganda for
the domestic German foes of the government and its policy of compliance
with the Versailles settlement.
The early years of Weimar foreign policy were therefore rancorous
times. They were provoked mostly by the implacable reparations
issue, and culminated in the disastrous French occupation of the
Ruhr. With the adoption of the Dawes Plan, thanks to American
initiative, there was some hope of coming to reasonable terms
between Germany and her former enemies. But the central fact of
these years was the Locarno Treaty, which finally promised to
bring Germany into a workable system of European politics. With
that Treaty the bad boy of Europe seemingly was accepted by the
European family on fairly equal terms.
The idea for a security pact designed to allay French fears and
guarantee Germany's western borders originated with the Germans.
The Cuno government suggested it in December, 1922. The subject
was broached again in May 1923, September 1924 and February 1925.
That this persistent effort finally resulted in triumph was largely
due to the courage and tenacity of Gustav Streseman, the Weimar
Republic's most important foreign minister and Lord D'Abernon,
the British Ambassador to Berlin.
Stresemann, the architect of Locarno, was motivated by fear of
independent British action to provide the shaky French with security
at Germany's expense. He sent a memorandum in January 1926 to
test English policy. At this time London was unwilling to make
an agreement that carried French evacuation of the Rhineland as
a corollary. So Streseman moved in the other direction and opened
negotiations with the French government in February. When the
Geneva Protocol, which was to strengthen the League of Nations
and give France greater security, was rejected by a new conservative
British government, Stresemann saw an opportunity for a border
agreement which the British were now willing to consider.
But Germany flatly refused to guarantee the Polish frontier as
well, while French opinion was equally adamant on its absolute
necessity. London leaned towards the German argument, being willing
to underwrite a guarantee of Germany's western frontier but had
little interest in the East. Stresemann was undoubtedly responding
to prevailing German opinion, vociferously expressed by the rightwing
parties, that refused to reconcile itself to the current boundaries
with Poland. Stresemann's primary goals were
1) the protection of Germans abroad;
2) the readjustment of the eastern frontiers and
3) a union with German Austria.
The latter was specifically prohibited by the Versailles Treaty,
but the idea refused to die in German minds. However, Stresemann
was shrewd enough to realize that these goals would have to be
achieved by using "finesse," as he put it, and by avoiding
any "great decisions." This presumably meant that a
piecemeal approach was more likely to succeed than the more typically
German sledgehammer method. He seems to have entertained the notion
that Danzig, under League of Nations supervision, could be fully
recovered.
Other former German territories ceded to Poland could also be
reincorporated, once Germany's diplomatic position was strong
enough. To Stresemann's way of thinking the essential issue was
not really compliance or non-compliance with the stipulations
of the Versailles Treaty, but whether equality could be denied
to Germany forever. He was intent upon raising Germany once more
to full power status. It is probably wrong, therefore, to call
Stresemann's diplomacy "fulfillment policy."
The French seemed to sense this basic orientation, when they insisted
that peace in Europe could only be guaranteed if Germany made
accords with her eastern neighbors, who would not be part of the
proposed security pact. But the French were not the only ones
who created problems for Stresemann.
At home the Nationalists and the Communists, on the the extreme
poles of the political spectrum, violently opposed his policy-even
threatened his life. Both parties-for different reasons-wanted
a more definite eastern orientation. This combined opposition
forced Stresemann to raise some reservations about article 16
in the League of Nations Covenant. This article implied that Germany
might have to participate in a League action to defend Poland,
if the latter were attacked by Russia. German entrance into the
League was generally held to be part of a security package. But
the French insisted on unconditional German entrance into the
League if she wanted a security pact.
The problem engendered by article 16 was discussed at Locarno,
among representatives from Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Belgium,
Poland and Czechoslovakia. The German government was very quixotic
about this. While it accepted an Allied invitation to Locarno,
the government at the same time unleashed a broadside on the issue
of war guilt and the evacuation of the Cologne zone of occupation.
This did not sabotage the conference, however, and a compromise
was achieved, whereby members of the League would cooperate against
aggressors, but each country would do what was compatible with
its military and geographic situation. The upshot of this was
that Germany signed arbitration treaties with Poland and Czechoslovakia
and agreed to maintain the territorial status quo determined by
the Versailles Treaty. The French thus gained a renunciation of
the claim to Alsace-Lorraine and the desired security guarantee
from Britain. But the real gainer was Germany, since she made
only a nominal sacrifice, a change in the territorial status quo
being wholly unrealistic.
It was now incumbent on Germany to convince the Allies of her
good will. The Rightist parties said it would mean the permanent
acceptance of the Versailles Diktat. In fact the Nationalists
left the Reichstag in protest. But Stresemann remained firm. He
told his countrymen that Locarno meant the Versailles methods
had finally been replaced by conciliation. The Allies made it
easier for the Reichstag to approve the treaty by immediate evacuation
of the Cologne zone. The vote was 271 to 174 and passage was assured
mostly because the Social Democrats decided to back Stresemann.
However, the "Locarno spirit" did not create an era
of universal amity. In March 1926 complications arose over Germany's
permanent seat on the Council of the League, since Poland, Czechoslovakia,
Spain and Brazil also demanded permanent seats on the Council.
Britain backed Spain and France supported the Poles. Sweden opposed
Poland. Spain finally gave up, but Brazil stuck to her guns.
The reaction to these unseemly wranglings were violent in Germany,
whose honor seemed to be aroused again. The Nationalists now accused
Stresemann of treason, but the SPD once more saved the government.
The Soviet Union now feared isolation and a reversal of the Rapallo
policy, initiated by the famous treaty of 1922. The Reichswehr,
so dependent on the secret military arrangement with Russia, was
also worried. Stresemann quickly assured Russia that Germany would
never be a party to an anti-Bolshevik crusade, and that article
16 was nothing to worry about. To confirm Rapallo, the Berlin
Treaty with Russia was signed in April 1926. This treaty assured
neutrality if either one of them were attacked by a third power.
The same arrangement applied to a possible economic boycott. Germany
even promised to oppose any anti-Bolshevik movement on be international
scene.
The Berlin Treaty created a sensation in Europe, since many felt
that it had virtually converted German-Soviet friendship into
an alliance. France, Czechoslovakia and Poland, understandably
enough, were particularly concerned. Poland and Rumania proceded
to renew their alliance. France also made an alliance with Rumania
to adumbrate what was known as the French alliance system. So,
1926 was a turning point in the early history of the Weimar Republic.
It ushered in what has generally come to be known as the good
years of the Weimar Republic. Some, like Dietrich Orlow, have
called this period "Fool's Gold."