However, whatever foreign policy successes the Weimar Republic
had achieved were net appreciated by the general public. Hitler's
anti-Versailles propaganda overshadowed these successes because
the public was impatient and wanted more substantial results.
The full extent of the political mobility regained by Germany
since 1919 was not generally appreciated until Hitler, in the
early days of power, began to make capital out of it. Time and
again the public gave him personal credit for what was really
the result of protracted labor by his predecessors.
Hitler had never been abroad and spoke no foreign language. He
regarded foreign policy as his own personal preserve. While prepared
to give his collaborators considerable scope in domestic affairs,
he disliked and discouraged their advice in external matters.
As time went on, his distrust of career diplomats led him to eliminate,
as far as he could, the influence of the German Foreign Service.
In his early work of propaganda, Mein Kampf, he had already developed
his conception of German foreign policy. He admired the historical
achievements of England, in which he saw proof of his theory of
the superiority of the Germanic race. He admired Fascist Italy
and its creator, Mussolini. He saw an alliance with England and
Italy as Germany's security for the future against the "unrelenting
mortal enemy" France. An alliance with England was also protection
against Soviet Russia, at whose expense, in particular, he wished
to enlarge Germany's "living space." Austria, the country
of his birth, was for him an integral part of Germany, and her
reunification with the Reich "a life's task, to be carried
out by every means."
In the first years sf Nazi foreign policy it looked as if Hitler
had abandoned most of the fundamentals of his program. Only later
did it become apparent that it was precisely in foreign politics
that he had held fast to his early beliefs.
To begin with, Hitler continued the foreign policy of his predecessors.
He made no experiments, particularly as Germany's international
prestige was much affected by events at home. The most vital international
issue, disarmament, was soon to be dominated by the fact that
Hitler was secretly rearming. Since the western powers, particularly
France, were not quite willing to give Germany equality in armaments,
Hitler withdrew from the Disarmament Conference and the League
of Nations as well.
This happened in October 1933 and was approved by 88% of the electorate
in a plebiscite. The public, unfortunately, did not realize the
consequences, one of which was Hitler's order to accelerate rearmament.
Hitler, of course, continued to profess his love of peace and
to make proposals for disarmament. But at the same time he made
it clear that he preferred bilateral agreements to that of securing
peace by multilateral treaties.
The first such bilateral agreement was the Polish-German Non-aggression
Pact of January 1934. It gave Nazi foreign policy a twofold advantage
by reducing tensions on the Eastern frontier and by reducing the
importance of the French alliance system. This pact also proved
a great advantage to Hitler four years later when he could move
against Austria and Czechoslovakia without fear of Polish intervention.
Poland's motives were mainly uneasiness about the Soviet Union.
It was Hitler's obsession with bilateral pacts which led him to
reject Franco-Soviet attempts to conclude an "Eastern Locarno"
pact, vigorously pursued by French Foreign Minister Barthou. This
rejection came immediately after the Soviet Union had joined the
League of Nations and came as no surprise since German-Soviet
relations were fast deteriorating.
After Barthou's assassination in October 1934, his successor Laval,
made overtures to Italy in order to win her over to the anti-revisionist
powers. At the same time England and France once more invited
Germany to participate in the solution of the rearmament problem
by adhering to the proposed settlement of the Yugolslav-Italian
border dispute. Hitler's reply to these overtures was unmistakable:
on March 16, 1935 he announced general conscription, thereby officially
admitting what the world already knew, although it had been done
in secret-that Germany was rearming.
Britain, France and Italy protested. The three powers met at Stresa
in April to form a united front in combination with the League
(the so-called Stresa Front). Sanctions against Germany were contemplated.
Meanwhile, France concluded a Mutual Assistance Pact with the
Soviet Union on May 2 and the Soviet Union entered into an alliance
with Czechoslovakia on May 16. Hitler seemed isolated by the embrace
of a European coalition.
But the sanctions were never put into effect, and the unity of
the Stresa Front went no farther than oratory. Hitler's critics
were thus silenced and in no time at all he was able to claim
a remarkable success for his policy of bilateral alliances, which
only seemed to prove the discord of the western Powers and encouraged
him to continue in the same way. On June 18, 1935 Britain signed
a Naval Agreement with Germany, which laid down the strengths
of the British and German fleets in a ratio of 100 to 35, with
parity in submarines. Thus Britain tacitly accepted German rearmament,
which shortly before she had condemned at Stresa. Among British
statesmen the pressure of world events, particularly in the Far
East, began to encourage the idea that peace in Europe could best
be preserved by appeasing Hitler with concessions.
The transitory nature of the Stresa Front became even clearer
when Mussolini attacked Abyssinia in the fall of 1935 despite
League of Nations sanctions. By the summer of 1936 Abyssinia had
been annexed. It was during this period that the relationship
between Italy and Germany was cemented. Since Germany helped Italy
with raw materials, Mussolini was willing to downgrade his opposition
to Hitler's designs on Austria. This German-Italian rapprochement
was further enhanced by close collaboration in the Spanish Civil
War which began in July 1936. Italy and Germany intervened on
the side of Franco's insurgents, thus assuring their ultimate
victory over the Republicans, who were supported by the Soviet
Union.
During the Abyssinian campaign, and under cover of the political
confusion it had caused, Hitler had risked a highly dangerous
move: on March 7, 1936 German troops marched into the Rhineland,
designated a demilitarized zone by the Treaty of Versailles. Hitler
justified this new breach of the treaty by arguing that he had
to protect Germany from the effect of the Franco-Soviet Pact,
which had been ratified by the French Chamber on February 27,
and which was incompatible with the Locarno Treaty. Once again
he was proved right against all warnings, particularly from his
generals. The only outcome was paper protests.
The first phase of Nazi foreign policy ended with a further spectacular
success. On November 25, 1936 Hitler signed a treaty with Japan-the
so-called "Anti-Comintern Pact"-for their common struggle
against the Third International. Its propaganda effect was greater
than its political substance. But it paved the way for future
German-Japanese collaboration with far-reaching possibilities.
In less than four years Hitler had achieved full freedom of movement
for Germany and had practically invalidated the Treaty of Versailles.
He had shattered the system of European collective pacts initiated
by France, and he bad gained the partnership of Poland, Italy
and Japan with his policy of bilateral agreements. He might have
been taken for a politician of genius. But only if one accepted
the basic assumption of his political actions: the conviction
that one's own nation was the most important in the world, regardless
of the claims of any other, and the assumption that breach of
contract and the use of force were legitimate means of policy.
But what were the aims of Nazism? Hitler never stopped assuring
the world that he wanted peace. But all the measures he took to
restore the economy, to raise production, increase exports, secure
raw materials, build up new industries and establish the self-sufficiency
of agriculture were designed for war. Did Hitler fear an attack
on Germany? On September 9, 1936 at Nuremberg, announcing the
second Four-Year Plan, which summarized economic preparations
for war, he spoke of the possibility of a "Bolshevik invasion,"
but this was in the tradition of Nazi propaganda and, at this
time, purely demagogic. Or did Hitler himself want a war? We know
now that by the autumn of 1937, if not earlier, he was prepared
to "rink using force," i.e., to make war at a relatively
short notice.
For on November 5, 1937, in the presence of the foreign Minister,
von Neurath, Hitler explained his plans for external policy to
his closest military collaborators, Blomberg, Fritsch, Raeder
and Goering, in an address lasting several hours, of which his
Wehrmacht aide-de-camp Hossbach made a memorandum a few days later.
He underlined the importance of his statement by adding that he
"wished it to be regarded as his testament in case of death."
He defined the aim of German policy as an effort to "safeguard
and preserve the nation and its growth." This, he said, could
only be achieved by a solution of the problem of "overcrowding,"
that is by achieving greater "living space" for the
German people, not in colonial territories overseas, but "in
the immediate proximity of the Reich in Europe."
There was only one way of achieving this, the way of force."
It was his "irrevocable decision" to solve Germany's
"living space problem,"-at the latest by 1943-1945,
but earlier still if the political circumstances were favorable,
and perhaps even in 1938. In any event, strategic considerations
made the overthrow and annexation of Czechoslovakia and Austria
the inevitable first steps.
Some of his remarks may have been intended to spur his hesitant
generals to speed up military preparations: nevertheless, the
further course of events showed Hitler to have been expressing
the ideas which guided his future policy. An entirely new note
had been struck. He foresaw the development of German rearmament
to the point where he could include military force in his plans
for foreign policy. From now on he seems to have waited impatiently
for the chance to play the card of Germany's military might accumulated
over the past five years.
There is no doubt that Hitler was extremely displeased when Blomberg
and Fritsch replied to his address with political and military
objections expressing a sharp and fundamental difference of views.
Their reaction was but one of a series of disappointments which
he had suffered in his relations with the command of the armed
forces. These relations had certainly not developed in accordance
with the close understanding behind his decisions in the summer
of 1934.
Since assuming supreme command after the death of Hindenburg he
had met with resistance by the generals on several occasions.
He felt they had been too hesitant in carrying out rearmament.
They had entertained political doubts about the moment for introducing
conscription, and technical doubts as to how it was to be carried
out. They had advised against the occupation of the Rhineland
as being still too great a risk. The doubts of Blomberg and Fritsch
about his plans for conquest were but one more instance of that
caution and hesitancy which irritated him because it hindered
him in his plans, and which he despised because he had already
so often triumphed over it.
In the light of his experiences Hitler decided on sweeping changes
in the personnel of the Wehrmacht leadership, and they took place
in highly questionable circumstances at the beginning of 1938.
The occasion was a scandal involving the War Minister von Blomberg.
In January 1938 Blomberg had married for a second time. Hitler
and Goering had been witnesses at his wedding. Shortly afterwards
it became known that Blomberg's bride was a lady of doubtful reputation.
On January 24 Goering presented the evidence to Hitler, who decided
that Blomberg must relinquish his office. Hitler seems to have
been surprised at this turn of affairs, which scarcely left him
with any alternative.
But the matter did not rest there. By January 25 a Gestapo file
was lying on Hitler's desk, incriminating von Fritsch, the Commander-in-Chief
of the Army, in homosexual activities. Hitler had seen the same
file before, in 1936. At that time he had refused to take up the
matter, and ordered the file to be destroyed. We now know that
at this juncture Hitler himself had the file reconstructed in
order to bring about the fall of Fritsch, who was already highly
inconvenient in his present position and would be even more so
as Blomberg's successor. Hitler relieved Fritsch of his command
and forced him to resign from the Army even before a court of
inquiry could investigate the matter.
As it tuned out, the court of inquiry established Fritsch's innocence.
His defence was able to prove that the incriminating evidence
did not concern him, but an ex-officer by the name of von Frisch.
In the end the Gestapo witness, a man with several previous convictions,
admitted that he had lied under pressure of Gestapo threats. But
the verdict did nothing to revoke Fritsch's dismissal. He bad
the greatest difficulty in being rehabilitated-and then not publicly-by
Hitler. On the outbreak of war he accompanied his regiment without
power of command, seeking his death, which he met before Warsaw.
The driving personalities behind this odious game were Goering.
Himmler and Heydrich. Goering pursued personal aims: he wanted
Blomberg's job, or at least the joint supreme command of the Army
and Air Force. Himmler and Heydrich, in the interests of the SS,
welcomed anything which would compromise its military rival and
weaken the position of the military leadership. The trio was furthermore
backed by the Party's old resentment of the Army. The Party welcomed
the downfall of Blomberg and Fritsch as a kind of revenge for
the Wehrmacht's triumph of June 30 1934. The Wehrmacht accepted
it without a murmur. But Goering's hopes were not fulfilled and
he had to be content with his appointment as a Field-Marshal.
Hitler had used the situation which chance and calculation had
placed into his hands to make decisive inroads upon the Wehrmacht's
independence. He performed a final act of ''coordination,"
hoping thereby to do away with some of the resistance which had
become so troublesome. He abolished the office of War Minister,
in which Blomberg had hitherto deputized for Hitler as supreme
commander of the armed forces, and assumed this designation himself.
From the Wehrmacht Office in the War Ministry he formed the Oberkommando
der Wehrmacht (or OKW) to be his personal staff as supreme commander.
At the same time the new Supreme Command took over the War Ministry's
work. He appointed as its chief a compliant general, Keitel, who
had succeeded Reichenau as Chief of the Wehrmacht Office in 1935.
General von Brauchitsch became Fritsch's successor as Commander-in-Chief
of the Army in circumstances which made him dependent on Hitler.
This new arrangement was strangely incongruous in so far as the
newly created OKW was not made senior to the commanders of the
three services but equal with them. This led to countless rivalries
and was to have disastrous consequences in the war. But it was
entirely in accordance with Hitler's principle o of creating within
the same department competing authorities, so as to counteract
the influence of individuals and lend greater weight to his personal
decisions.
Hitler combined the changes in the command of the armed forces
with a whole series of personnel changes in the military and diplomatic
field. The most important of these concerned the Foreign Ministry.
Joachim von Ribbentrop, his diplomatic adviser of long standing
and former Ambassador tn London, became Foreign Minister-a change
which meant that at last the Wilhelmstrasse too was included in
the "co-ordination." To cover this with a smoke-screen,
Hitler invented a "Privy Cabinet Council," ostensibly
to advise him on foreign affairs, and made the outgoing Foreign
Minister von Neurath, its President. The Council never once met.
The German public was not informed of what had happened behind
the scenes. On February 4, 1938 a communique merely announced
the changes that had been made. How Hitler wanted them to be received
becomes clear from two sentences entered in the diary of General
Alfred Jodl, Keitel's closest collaborator, on January 31, 1938:
"Führer wants to divert the searchlights from
the Wehrmacht, keep Europe on tenterhooks, and by recasting various
roles give the impression of a concentration of strength, not
of a moment of weakness. Schuschnigg must not take courage but
fright."
During the impending visit of the Austrian Chancellor, Hitler
meant to carry the question of German-Austrian unification a decisive
step farther. A few weeks after the crisis over Blomberg and Fritsch
he marched into Austria.